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Abstract 
This paper sketches a causal account of scientific explanation designed to sustain 
the judgment that high-level, detail-sparse explanations—particularly those offered 
in biology—can be at least as explanatorily valuable as lower-level counterparts. 
The motivating idea is that complete explanations maximize causal economy: they cite 
those aspects of an event’s causal run-up that offer the biggest-bang-for-your-buck, 
by costing less (in virtue of being abstract) and delivering more (in virtue making the 
event stable or robust).  
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1—Introduction 
What distinguishes good scientific explanations, those that enlighten and 
captivate us, from their work-a-day peers, which may minimally account for the 
phenomena at hand but without inspiration? Abstraction is a popular answer. One 
explanation is more abstract than another when its explanans says less than does 
the other, ruling out fewer ways that the world might be. Since high-level 
explanations—those exploiting the special vocabularies of economics, psychology 
and biology, for example—are informationally impoverished compared to those 
offered, at least in principle, by basic physics, it is unsurprising that abstraction has 
been important to those who aspire to make sense of the special virtues of 
explanations provided by the high-level sciences. 
 But just why is abstraction such a good thing? Two distinct strategies have been 
deployed to account for abstraction’s special worth: appeal to the explanatory value 
of generality and to the importance of causal difference-makers. 
 Pursuing the first path, Putnam (1975) claimed that explanations citing abstract 
geometrical properties were optimal in virtue of applying to a wide range of 
different actual cases, such as to similarly shaped pegs and holes made of different 
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materials. Kitcher (1981, 1984, 1999) too accounted for abstraction with the help 
of the more fundamental virtue of generality. He argued that correct explanations 
appeal to cohesive argument patterns that are actually instantiated in a wide range 
of systems, and that any pattern doing so will necessarily abstract from the “gory 
details” (Kitcher 1984: 370). And following Levins (1966), Sober (2000) suggested 
that abstraction results from the need to generalize, writing that “in order to isolate 
general patterns, we abstract away from the idiosyncrasies that distinguish some 
objects from others”(66). 
 Generality-based (or ‘unificationist’) explanatory approaches find fewer 
adherents today, and causal accounts are increasingly dominant. Though early causal 
theories, such as those offered by Railton (1981) and Salmon (1984), made no room 
for abstraction, currently popular difference-making accounts do better. Because 
they hold that non-difference-making causal influences are not explanatory, they are 
able to recommend at least some measure of abstraction without relying on the 
explanatory value of generality itself. For instance, on Strevens’ (2008) kairetic view, 
to explain an event is to cite a causal model that has undergone an optimizing 
procedure that leaves it including a set of relatively abstract, but still physical, 
difference-makers. And Woodward (2003, 2010) suggests that his interventionist 
account can also support the judgment that high-level, abstract explanations are, at 
least sometimes, optimal.  
 Though all of these explanatory approaches are rich in insights, they each leave 
something to be desired as accounts of high-level explanation. Speaking against 
generality theories is the widespread hunch that generality in itself is explanatorily 
irrelevant, a mere byproduct of explanations that cite causes rather than an 
independent source of explanatory force. A second problem is that, in spite of the 
way they are advertised, if the most general explanatory patterns are provided by 
the physical facts and laws, generality-based theories may in fact leave no room for 
high-level explanations. Of course, this conclusion might be resisted by 
distinguishing the good or ‘real’ patterns, under which phenomena should be 
unified, from the explanatorily irrelevant patterns, which are pitched at levels either 
too high or too low or that that seem gerrymandered. But this distinction has 
proved difficult to draw in a principled way. For instance, in perhaps the most 
influential defense of high-level biological explanation to date, Kitcher (1984) 
simply appeals to a brute and unexplained notion of processes that constitute 
natural kinds to do the work.  
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 Causal-difference-making accounts, though avoiding some of the difficulties 
just mentioned, also face problems, among the most notable of which is this: 
though they permit some level of explanatory abstraction, no extant causal theory 
recommends explanations nearly as abstract as those that high-level scientists 
actually formulate. For instance, on Woodward’s (2003) basic interventionist view, 
an explanation is explanatory in virtue of answering what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. High-level explanations can answer some such questions, and 
are thereby somewhat explanatory. But fully reductive accounts would seem to 
answer more, and so Woodward’s theory appears committed to regarding them as 
superior.1  
The account of scientific explanation outlined here—the Causal Economy 
account—aims to go much further than competing theories in recognizing 
explanations as abstract as those that high-level scientists actually provide as 
complete, optimal explanations.  Moreover, it does so within a causal framework 
that eschews any direct appeal to generality or to metaphysically questionable 
notions like top-down causes, emergent properties, patterns, high-level individuals, 
or high-level natural kinds. 
 To set the stage for this view, I proceed in section 2 to present an example of 
explanatory black boxing, a pervasive style of explanation in the high-level sciences. 
Section 3 elaborates on the difficulties facing proponents of causal explanation who 
aim to make sense of abstract explanations of this kind. In section 4 the Causal 
Economy account is outlined and in section 5 its details are described. Section 6 
considers how the account treats simple examples and might be adapted to more 
complex ones. Section 7 concludes by exploring the basic rationale for the entire 
Causal Economy explanatory picture. 
 
2—Motivating Example 
                                                             
1 This interpretation of the commitments of the interventionist approach is particularly 
clear in Hitchcock and Woodward (2003). Woodward (2010) has more recently suggested 
that a distinct explanatory standard, proportionality, can also support a high-level 
preference. My [2016a] argues that this particular proposal is not successful. For a recent 
attempt to avoid such reductionist implications by using the interventionist approach in 
combination with information theory, see Andersen (2017).  
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Figure 1: The Hermann Grid 
 Printed above is a Hermann Grid. While the background between the black 
squares is uniformly white, most people see ghostly gray smudges at the 
intersections of the squares. How might we explain the particular event of my 
perception of these smudges right now? The classic account of this illusion, offered 
first by Baumgartner (1960), goes as follows:2 the receptive field of my eye, the 
retina, includes two layers of neurons: a layer of light-receptive elements 
(photoreceptors) and a layer of retinal ganglion cells, one abutting the other. They 
are connected in a lateral inhibitory network, where retinal ganglion cells are 
activated by the firing of photoreceptors at the same location in the layer as 
themselves, and inhibited by the firing of neighboring photoreceptors on all sides. 
This pattern of connections is illustrated in cross section in the diagram below 
(figure 2). 
 
                                                             
2 Though pervasively cited in textbooks (Sekuler and Blake 1994, Palmer 1999, Snowden 
2006), this account is not uncontroversial (Spillman 1971). Other explanations have been 
offered (de Lafuente and Ruiz 2004; Ash, Comerford, and Thorn 2003), though no 
particular alternative has gained wide support. I set aside these controversies here, since 
the classic explanation would be a good one, if true, and since the rival explanations 
(invoking cortical mechanisms) would also involve ‘black-boxing,’ which is the feature of 
philosophical interest here.  
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Figure 2: Cross-section of lateral inhibition network  (modified from Palmer 
1999: 116). Photoreceptor cells are represented by cones; retinal ganglion cells 
by circles. Excitatory relations are indicated by arrows; inhibitory relations by 
dots. 
 
These lateral inhibitory connections between my neurons, in combination with 
the input pattern of light to my photoreceptor cells, provide the foundation for an 
explanation of the appearance of grey spots at the intersections of the Hermann 
Grid. When I look at the grid, light focused on my retina takes the pattern of the 
shape printed on the page. Photoreceptor firing frequency is in proportion to light 
exposure. And given the connective architecture already described, photoreceptor 
firing activates retinal ganglion cells immediately adjacent to them and inhibits their 
neighbors. Retinal ganglion cells corresponding to photoreceptors that receive light 
from some place along the non-intersecting white areas of the image are only 
laterally inhibited by neighboring excited cells on two sides, while cells at 
intersections are inhibited by neighbors on four sides (see figure 3). This heightened 
inhibition decreases the firing rate of retinal ganglion cells corresponding to the 
intersections at which gray smudges are seen. Since there is a direct relationship 
between ganglion firing rate and the brightness of the white perceived, we can in 
this way account for the perception of gray smudges at intersections in terms of 
light input and the particular network architecture. 
 
 
Figure 3: Illusion explained (from Palmer 1999: 118) 
 
3—The Black-Boxing Challenge  
 Many scientific texts offer versions of the above explanation. And it certainly 
seems illuminating, arguably describing just the features relevant to the target 
phenomenon, without extraneous molecular details. Furthermore, in form it is 
typical of explanations found elsewhere in neuroscience, developmental and 
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evolutionary biology, and across the high-level sciences.3 For instance, 
developmental biologists offer explanations structurally similar it (i.e., invoking 
lateral inhibitory networks) in accounting for how certain cells are determined to 
become hair cells in the fruit fly, or how certain cells are determined to become 
different neuronal types in zebra fish (Appel et al. 2001).   
 Yet it is exceedingly difficult to make sense of the special value of the above 
explanation from a strictly causal perspective. However the details might be spelled 
out, a central insight of the causal approach is that explanations show how things work. 
The Hermann Grid explanation does show something about how things work, for 
instance by describing the effects of photoreceptor firing on ganglion cells. But it 
says much less about how things work than is currently possible, or (some might 
think) than is in principle desirable. 
 In particular, it says less than it might in virtue of its black boxing—that is, in 
virtue of the fact that, rather than citing physical laws and physical arrangements 
to account for the target event, it appeals to a few input conditions in concert with 
a series of interconnected entities (the black boxes) understood to produce certain 
outputs in response to certain inputs. For instance, photoreceptors and retinal 
ganglion cells are treated as black boxes, firing in response either to light exposure 
or other neuronal input. What black boxing accounts do not do is to account for 
the mechanistic underpinnings of a black box’s input-output relationships. And 
though many explanations in biology (and elsewhere in the high-level sciences) are 
more mechanistic in flavor than the Hermann Grid account, they still usually appeal 
to black boxes of their own. For example, though a molecular biologist would 
rarely black box an entire cell, a protein or ribosome may be so treated. At the other 
extreme, some evolutionary and ecological explanations, which elide the 
mechanisms of mutation and the detailed workings of both an organism and its 
environment, exploit—explicitly or otherwise—black boxes at a grander scale. 
 Given the pervasiveness of black boxing, it is remarkable that even the most 
abstraction-friendly causal explanatory theories cannot recommend the accounts 
that feature them. For instance, as noted already, Woodward’s (2003) influential 
view is that an explanation is explanatory in virtue of answering what-if-things-had-
been-different questions (w-questions). The Hermann Grid explanation will 
answer some w-questions, such as where I would see illusory gray smudges were I 
                                                             
3 See Kitcher (1999), Levy and Bechtel (2013) for a variety of alternative examples of 
abstract explanations from different biological domains.  
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to gaze at other printed patterns. However, an explanation that did not black box 
would answer strictly more w-questions, as it would be capable of accounting for 
what might have happened had the conditions required to maintain the black 
boxes’ input-output relationships been disrupted. Thus, Woodward’s proposal can 
make sense of the minimal adequacy of black-boxing explanations, but will invariably 
rule them less explanatory than any lower-level alternative.4 Similarly, Strevens’ 
kairetic account requires that mechanistic underpinnings be included in complete 
'stand-alone' explanations. In consequence, the kairetic framework—while able to 
make sense of other forms of explanatory abstraction—never judges a causal 
model containing black boxes explanatorily optimal. 
Why then, from a causal-explanatory point-of-view, are black boxing 
explanations so common in the sciences? Pragmatic considerations provide one 
tempting answer. Perhaps scientists present black boxing explanations in the form 
that they do because adding mechanistic details—though preferable on purely 
explanatory grounds—would overwhelm our limited human minds. Or perhaps 
each scientific subfield, for reasons of efficiency, provisionally treats high-level 
entities as explanatorily basic, even though complete explanations will ultimately 
banish black boxes entirely. Indeed, if you include enough ‘pragmatic 
considerations,’ you can almost always find a way of accounting for the 
explanations that scientists actually provide. 
Yet, for those who take scientific practice as the key benchmark against which 
a theory of explanation should be judged, the failure of causal accounts to make 
room for explanatorily optimal black-boxing accounts should be distressing. Even 
granting that this form of abstraction can sometimes be accounted for on practical 
grounds—e.g., by the fact that we simply do not know what links certain inputs to 
certain outputs—its ubiquity in the explanatory annals suggests that there may be 
a distinct explanatory merit in these detail-sparse accounts. At the very least, the 
enormous gap between actual explanatory practice and the rulings of extant 
accounts seems reason enough to undertake the project of this paper: to pursue an 
explanatory theory that prescribes, rather than just tolerates, the kind of abstract 
explanations just reviewed.   
                                                             
4 For discussion, see Weslake (2010: §2) and Franklin-Hall (2016a). 
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What problems must such a theory address, if it is to be successful? Here are 
two: the stop problem and the carving problem.5 The stop problem is the challenge of 
articulating a vision of scientific explanation according to which optimal 
explanations should, on explanatory grounds, omit mention of mechanistic 
underpinnings even though they are causally relevant. After all, at least some of the 
happenings temporally between inputs and outputs of photoreceptors are 
difference-makers for output events and are part of the causal processes leading to 
them. So how could it ever be explanatorily preferable to omit their mention?6 
The carving problem is the challenge of specifying just which black boxes should 
be appealed to in an adequate or optimal explanation. After all, for any target 
phenomenon there are numerous ways of representing the system responsible for 
it with schemes of interconnected black boxes, with each such scheme 
characterizing veridical and causal relationships. For instance, the Hermann Grid 
Illusion explanation above might have treated not individual photoreceptors as black 
boxes, but instead collections of them; equally, it might have treated as black-boxes 
entities that cross-cut neurons as they are customarily individuated. In 
consequence, an illuminating explanatory account—one that helped explain 
explanatory practice and did not merely describe its surface features—would need 
to offer principles that specified which black boxes were explanatorily legitimate, 
and which were unacceptable and gerrymandered.7 
 
4—Causal Economy in Outline 
In describing the Causal Economy account, I will focus on event explanation, 
which is arguably the most difficult case for an account of high-level explanation 
to handle. (I believe extensions to probabilistic, regularity, and contrastive 
explanations are relatively straightforward, but for reasons of space they must here 
be left aside.) For the sake of simplicity, I will further focus on a relatively simple 
kind of explanation—what I call a direct event explanation. Direct event explanations 
appeal to a state of affairs and at most one causal principle linking inputs and 
                                                             
5 I articulate these challenges in my [2016b], where they used to evaluate mechanistic 
accounts of explanation. 
6 On the ‘stop problem,’ see Block’s (1990) ‘reductionist cruncher’ and Jackson and Pettit 
(1992). 
7 A third important problem facing abstraction-friendly explanatory accounts, the 
‘disjunction’ or ‘overshooting’ problem—pressed in my [2016a] against one version of 
Woodward’s view—must be put aside here for reasons of space. 
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outputs. Some of these are, as it were, black-boxing accounts appealing to just one 
black box. Yet even direct explanations can either call upon a detailed state of 
affairs or high-level, abstract one, so this focus does permit me to display the basic 
capacity of the Causal Economy view to prefer high-level accounts.  
The explanandum event might be perfectly concrete, individuated by all of its 
intrinsic properties (e.g., the fine-grained spilling of a glass of milk, with one droplet 
sinking into the carpet, another splattering on the cat’s nose, etc.), or it might be 
individuated in a coarse-grained way (e.g., the mere emptying of the glass of its 
contents). The aim of explanation, on the Causal Economy account, is to identify 
the most important causal factors underlying some phenomenon, those factors in 
virtue of which the explanandum event was, to a rather substantial degree, bound to 
happen. The account’s characterization of what constitutes ‘the most important 
causal factors’ has two parts: (1) a thin notion of causal influence and (2) a 
substantive ‘selection principle,’ which aims to isolate the explanatorily relevant 
aspects of the causal web. 
 The starting material from which an explanation is to be constructed is the 
basic causal tissue of our universe, which I will call causal influence. Any feature of 
the universe—whether a law or a state of affairs—in virtue of which any particular 
event happened just as it did is a causal influence on that event. Given the long reach 
of gravity and other physical laws, this means that causal influence is extensive; 
anything in the past light-cone of an event is a causal influence on that event. Thus, 
among the causal influences on my sneeze will be, not just the pollen in the air 
today and my hyper-active immune system, but also the wanderings of a particular 
wombat in the Australian Outback. Events, therefore, have countless causal 
influences extending far out in space and far back in time. 
 How should we understand the metaphysics of causal influence? Should it be 
understood in counterfactual terms, by appeal to regularities, the transfer of 
conserved quantities, or something else? Though some theories of causal 
explanation take a stand on such weighty matters, I will remain non-committal on 
the metaphysical nature of causal influence; it is possible to understand it in any of 
the ways just mentioned.8 The one requirement I make is that causal influence is 
fully physical and thus describable in physical terms. It is best to understand causal 
influence physically, first, because of the appreciable evidence that our universe’s 
movers-and-shakers are indeed physical laws acting on physical systems, and 
                                                             
8 See Strevens (2008) for further discussion of this kind of approach. 
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second because a defense of high-level explanation is more powerful dialectically 
if it presumes a stark physical foundation.   
 Though all explanatory factors are causal influences on the Causal Economy 
view, not all causal influences are explanatory. Given that we want a theory faithful 
to actual explanatory practice, a complete event explanation will describe only a 
certain package of causal influences constituting the most important parts of the 
exceedingly complex complete causal story of an event. To pick out these major 
causal contours for an event is the task of the selection principle, which can be thought 
of as a sieve into which you feed packages of causal influence to separate out the 
packages of explanatory gold from the mounds of unimportant granite that 
surrounds it. 
 And just which causal influences should be selected as explanatory? If we want 
the major causal contours to correspond reasonably well with the content of actual 
explanatory texts, then we will want to include what they include and omit what 
they omit. As far as what should be omitted, this breaks down into three categories, 
informally described as follows:  
 
(1) Causal influences with little consequence on the target event (like that of 
the antipodean wombat on my sneeze); 
(2) Causal influences with a large effects on the target, but systematically 
treated as ‘background factors’ (like the role of oxygen in explaining a 
forest fire); 
(3) Concrete details of certain causal influences when the specifics don’t 
matter (like the particular location of particular transcription factors in a 
cell, rather than their overall concentration, in accounting for the cell’s 
protein production). 
 
 That any single selection principle might successfully deal with all of these 
aspects of explanatory practice may sound too good to be true. After all, these 
issues have traditionally been approached separately. For instance, the second 
represents what is often called the ‘causal selection problem,’ and is usually 
disposed of in pragmatic terms. The third concerns part of the problem of proper 
‘explanatory level,’ and while it is more often thought amenable to a principled 
solution, there is no consensus on what that is. I will suggest, however, that all 
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three of these aspects of explanatory selection spring from a common source and 
can be elucidated with a common selection principle.  
In general, the core feature of the principle I recommend is that correct 
explanation is the product of trade-offs between two features, one that drives 
explanations to be more concrete and fine grained and another that rewards higher 
level of abstraction. In particular, an event is explained by a package of causal 
influences that maximizes the ratio of delivery to cost.9 That is, the package will 
include those causal influences that make it the case that the target event was, to as 
great a degree as possible, bound to happen (thus ‘delivering more’), while 
containing as little information as possible about the complete causal run-up to the 
event (thus ‘costing less’). In this way, complete explanations give you the biggest 
bang-for-your-buck. 
These notions will be elaborated in detail in the following section, but very 
briefly, a package costs less when it rules out fewer ways that the world might be. 
A package delivers more when, given that its causal influences took place, the 
explanandum event would still have taken place in spite of a greater number of 
circumstances having been different. As a rule, cheapness and delivery trade off: 
cheaper explanations deliver less; costly explanations deliver more. This can be 
illustrated at the extremes: all of an event’s causal influences (which would be fully 
inventoried in an ‘ideal explanatory text’ on Railton’s view) ensure that event’s 
happening. At the other extreme, the thinnest sliver of the causal-influential nexus 
will offer very little stability: things could have gone just a bit differently, consistent 
with the influences cited in explanans, and the event would not have occurred. At 
the extremes, then, you get what you pay for. 
Yet trade-offs can be more or less acute. In our universe there are ‘sweet spots’ 
where cost and delivery do not increase in lock-step, and it is here that the best 
explanations—those the Causal Economy account judges complete—are located. 
Complete explanations piece together the bits of causal influence that out-do 
themselves, offering disproportionate stability to the target event for their cost. As 
will be illustrated presently, these are found wherever there are robust processes, 
which are exceedingly common in biology and the high-level sciences more 
generally. It is largely because of such processes that high-level, detail-sparse 
explanation is possible at all.  
                                                             
9 I leave open the possibility that there may be different ‘currencies’ in which these trade-
offs might be formulated. 
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To take a toy example, consider an explanation for a ball’s being located at the 
bottom of a bowl. In the lead up to this event, the ball was placed at a particular 
spot on the inside rim, which would be among the explanandum event’s influences. 
To cite this particular position in explanation of the ball’s final destination, however, 
is costly. A better explanation would specify that the ball was placed somewhere within 
the rim. This explanation is obviously much cheaper. And it delivers quite a lot: 
given that the ball was somewhere in the rim, lots of other things might have been 
different and the ball would still end up at the bottom. Another illustration comes 
from the explanation of a neuron’s firing. One explanation might describe the 
neuron’s complete physical architecture. But a cheaper one—typical of some high-
level accounts that treat neurons as black boxes and only describe their input-
output behaviors—would cite just that it was exposed to neurotransmitters above 
some concentration. Given this exposure, due to the robustness-making 
architecture of neurons (e.g., the large-scale redundancy of ion-based 
depolarization), lots of things might have been different and the firing would still 
take place. Thus it too is a cheap account offering rather substantial delivery. 
Because there can be different robust processes—often at different spatial or 
temporal scales—involved in the lead-up to some events there might be multiple 
ways of achieving good economy. An explanation with low cost and modest 
delivery might be comparable to another explanation with higher cost and more 
substantial delivery, as they both offer the same ratio of delivery to cost. This is a 
welcome result if we want to account, in a principled, non-pragmatic way, for the 
diversity in explanatory practice that actually exists in and between scientific 
disciplines.  
This tolerance for diversity notwithstanding, the selection principle will not be 
‘anything goes.’ The principle has substance in virtue of ruling out many putative 
explanations. For instance, explanations that carve systems in ‘unnatural’ ways will 
be rejected, since these are usually descriptively costly without offering 
proportionate stability. Consider, for instance, an explanation for a neuron’s 
firing—that is, its release of neurotransmitters at its axon terminal—that carved it 
into what we would normally consider a gerrymandered way. This release might be 
explained by citing the state of the cell body—rather than the axon terminal—at 
some prior time. Yet to do this in way that said enough to specify that that structure 
was in the midst of firing would be rather complex: it would need to at least detail 
the state of numerous ion channels and an ion differential across the membrane 
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surrounding the cell. This will be much more costly than one appealing only to the 
neuron’s exposure to some high concentration of neurotransmitters. The selection 
principle also addresses the stop problem: even granting that low-level explanations 
do deliver more than abstract ones, they are also expensive. Thus it does not follow 
that fundamental-level explanations are always superior to more abstract, higher-
level alternatives.  
 
5—Causal Economy in Detail 
I’ve just described Causal Economy view in a rather general way, to offer a 
flavor of the approach. This section will delve into the details of its three key 
concepts: packages of causal influence, cost, and delivery. These details are somewhat 
involved, but are important if we are to evaluate the account’s capacity to describe 
the structure of actual scientific explanations without having simply presumed a 
high-level individuation of the universe into parts and kinds.  
In doing this, however, I will not be concerned with another task that has 
received more attention from philosophers (though more commonly 
metaphysicians, rather than philosophers of science): showing that the account can 
reproduce judgments about the best explanation of events in systems that are not 
usually studied by scientists, such as in certain kinds of complex preemption 
scenarios. My view is that the principles governing our scientific explanatory 
practice—those that it is the job of the philosopher of explanation to uncover and 
evaluate—were trained on the kinds of causal systems scientists actually encounter. 
We do, I admit, sometimes have relatively strong intuitions about what causes (or 
causally explains) events even elsewhere, when events are said to be brought about 
by mechanisms designed to thwart causal-explanatory theories. It is an interesting 
question both why this is the case and what principles generate our judgments. But 
both because it has proven extremely difficult to capture these judgments in a 
unified way, and because it is hard enough to offer principles that honor the 
structure of explanations in the actual systems that scientists study, I must restrict 
my focus to these cases.  
 
A—Packages of Causal Influence 
The selection principle picks the major causal contours from a large set of packages 
of causal influence. But just what are these? They can be understood as having been 
created, in a ‘production’ step, from the complete causal story for an event. Given 
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the terrifically interconnected universe in which we live, the complete story 
includes, as noted above, everything in the past light-cone of the event: all states of 
affairs are influences, and all laws in virtue of which those states of affairs are 
influences are themselves influences. Assume a representational scheme expressive 
enough to describe all of this. (Given that causal influence is fundamental-level, 
this will be a fundamental-level language.) The many distinct packages of influence 
can be produced from it by either omitting mention of causal influences and/or by 
representing some of these influences more abstractly.  
The idea of omitting certain causal influences is straightforward, but the idea 
of abstraction calls for some comment. Abstraction can work in three ways: by 
coarse-graining, amalgamation, and populational transformation. In coarse-graining 
abstraction, factors are not specified precisely, but only as falling within some range, 
or above or below some threshold. For example: ‘over 15kg*m/s’ rather than 
‘20kg*m/s.’ In amalgamating abstraction, the features cited are combinations of lower-
level parameters. For example, ‘momentum of 20kg*m/s’ rather than ‘mass of 2kg 
and velocity of 10 m/s.’ In abstraction by populational transformation, the factors cited 
are population-level features, like temperature or concentration, rather than 
individual-level ones, like kinetic energy. 
When these omission and abstraction procedures are applied—in every 
possible order and extent—to the representation of the complete story, a host of 
limited representations will result. Each of these rehearses just some part of the 
complete causal saga and constitutes a single package of causal influence. Some will 
include very little of the causal-influential story, some much more, some peculiar 
and disconnected bits. As an idealization, we imagine running each package 
through the selection principle, and have it measure modal delivery/descriptive 
cost. (In practice, of course, we never actually examine every possible causal 
package, but work from a highly compressed short-list.) Those packages that are 
maximal by this measure are the major causal contours, and constitute complete 
explanations. But just what is cost, and what is delivery? We turn to these next.  
 
B—Cost 
An explanation costs less in virtue of specifying fewer of the causal influences 
on an explanandum event and in less detail. To specify fewer causal influences and 
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in less detail is understood in terms of ruling out fewer ways the world might have 
been.10 
  It is easy to see that the omission of small influences, background factors, and 
features that are very concrete are all preferred when we favor less costly 
explanations. For example, an explanation for a particular neuron’s firing would 
cost less by omitting mention of the small influence of a nearby massive object 
with only gravitational effects on the neuron. Likewise, an explanation that stated 
only that the neuron was at some prior time exposed to neurotransmitters would 
cost less than a rival explanation that also mentioned the background factor that 
sodium ions were above some specific concentration outside the cell wall. Finally, 
an explanation that cited the concentration of neurotransmitters to which the neuron 
was exposed would cost less than one that detailed the overly concrete description 
of the particular location and trajectory of each neurotransmitter molecule. 
 Yet cost considerations alone threaten to also omit the factors that do appear 
explanatorily relevant, since they cost something as well. This is where the delivery 
metric comes in. 
 
C—Delivery 
Defining Stability Boost 
 The delivery metric is the most complicated part of the Causal Economy 
picture. An explanation delivers more to the extent that it specifies a package of causal 
influence that provides a greater ‘stability boost.’ An event is more stable when the 
event occurs in spite of a greater number of things being different. A package of 
causal influences, therefore, boosts stability to the extent that the explanandum 
event is more stable when those causal influences occur than otherwise.11  
The delivery or ‘stability boost’ of a package of causal influences can be 
understood to be the difference between two values, which I call the construct stability 
and the baseline stability. Put simply, the construct stability is the number of nearby 
possible worlds in which the explanandum event occurs, when fixing, in each of 
those worlds, that the causal influences specified in the explanans also occur. The 
                                                             
10 To give substance to the idea of ruling out more or fewer ways the world might have 
been, we require a fine-grained and non-gerrymandered physical scheme of world 
individuation. I am assuming such a scheme is in principle available. 
11 Others who have emphasized the importance of stability in causal-explanatory contexts, 
with different conceptions of stability on offer, include Craver (2007), Lewis (1986: 
postscript C), Mitchell (2000), Woodward (2006).  
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baseline stability is the number of nearby possible worlds in which the 
explanandum event occurs simpliciter, that is, not fixing (in either direction) whether 
the causal influences are as specified in the explanans.12 So:  
 
stability boost = construct stability – baseline stability 
 
Excepting cost considerations, complete explanations have a maximal stability 
boost. This reflects, I submit, the stability that the causal influences cited in the 
explanans provide to the target event. 
 So far I have helped myself to a set of nearby possible worlds. How should 
they be understood? Let us call the relevant set of nearby possible worlds the close 
range. This is a collection of worlds in which things went ‘just a bit differently’ than 
in the actual world, deviating from the actual world due to one or more small 
perturbations. The close range can be envisioned as a layered onion of possibility 
surrounding the actual world, where the inner-most layer contains worlds in which, 
by a Lewisian ‘small miracle,’ there has been a single perturbation on some component 
of the world, deflecting the course of that world from that of our own, howsoever 
slightly. That inner layer, in particular, contains a world corresponding to every 
possible single perturbation that could be carried out on the actual world. To 
produce the second layer, take each member of the first layer, and produce new set 
of worlds by executing an additional perturbation. This procedure is then iterated 
some specified number of times to produce the full close range.13 
 To define baseline stability from the close range, we begin by allowing all the 
worlds contained in it to unfold according to the physical laws until the 
explanandum event either definitely does or does not occur. The baseline stability 
is the number of worlds in the close range in which the explanandum event does 
occur. 
 Defining construct stability is more complicated. Recall that this is supposed to 
measure the number of nearby possible worlds in which, having ensured that the 
                                                             
12 As will come out below, because the baseline stability for a target event is the same for 
all candidate explanans, the work of the measure is done by the construct stability. Yet it 
is still notionally helpful to see the stability boost as the difference between these factors. 
13 Several of the key parameters of this characterization have been left vague. These are 
discussed in more detail below.  These specifics are postponed partly to avoid cluttering 
the exposition and partly because there may be different ways of filling out those details 
and the big picture is what matters more. 
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causal influences specified in the explanans do occur, the explanandum event also 
occurs. To define construct stability, we allow the worlds in the close range to 
unfold according to the laws until the causal influences cited in the explanans have 
definitely occurred or not. In those worlds in which the causal influences do not 
occur, we introduce them by a small miracle. We now have, not our initial close 
range of possible worlds, but a new construct that is sibling to it in which the 
relevant causal influences occur in every world. Next we let these worlds unfold 
according to the laws until the explanandum event definitely does or does not 
occur. The construct stability is the number of worlds in this sibling range in which 
the explanandum event occurs. 
 As I’ve already noted, the stability boost is the difference between construct 
stability and baseline stability. It represents the additional stability that the candidate 
explanans provides the explanandum.  
 
D—The Parameters of the Close Range 
With this definition of stability boost in hand, it is worth saying something 
about the parameters that went into defining the close range:  the components of the 
world are candidates for perturbation, what a single perturbation is, the time at which 
the worlds of the close range are first permitted to diverge, and the number of 
perturbations in the outermost layer of the close range. 
 What are the basic components of the world that are candidates for 
perturbation? In principle, these might be restricted to components within a 
contained system (e.g., the cell, the visual system, etc.) or they might range over the 
whole universe. Further, these components might be composite or ‘high-level’ 
individuals (like populations or cells) or more basic ones (like fundamental 
particles). I will opt for the latter, low-level components only, and will permit 
perturbations on any feature in the world, not just those constrained to a particular 
system. In this way, I will not have to presume a controversial high-level scheme 
of individuation of either parts or of wholes, which I see as the output of an 
explanatory theory rather than its input.  
What counts as a single perturbation will partly depend on how we have divided 
the world into basic components, since the perturbation must affect some feature 
of those components. For example, if we divided the world into atoms, 
characterized by their physical location and electronic configurations, then a single 
perturbation might affect either of these properties of a single atom in a small way. 
18 
 
But what do we mean by a small way? For instance, how far can the atom be moved, 
or its electron’s state elevated? Given that we are working with a fine-grained 
division of the world, I believe it does not matter much how we answer that 
question. This is because most of the action in distinguishing some packages of 
causal influences from others is going to take place some considerable distance 
from the actual world, in layers containing worlds into which a great many 
perturbations have been introduced. These more substantial changes could have 
been constructed from very different ways of defining a single perturbation.  
At what point in time in the actual world do we start introducing perturbations? 
In principle, it might be any time before the explanandum event, and (given the 
way we measure delivery) our choice of this parameter will determine the earliest 
time at which a causal influence can be even potentially judged as providing any 
stability boost. The choice of the time parameter is therefore quite consequential. 
But, unless one goes back to the beginning of time, it seems that it must also be 
conventional. This conventionality, however, should not surprise us. In searching 
for explanations, scientists do tend to narrow their temporal gaze.  
The final parameter in the setting the close range is the number of iterated 
perturbations, which sets the maximal difference between the actual world and any 
particular world in the close range.14 This must be conventional as well, but not in 
any threatening way. Analogous to the way the time of perturbations reflects the 
‘temporal gaze’ of our explanatory practice, this feature is indicative of our ‘modal 
gaze.’   
 
6—Causal Economy in Practice 
Causal Economy’s emphasis on an explanation’s costing less and delivering more 
work together by pulling in different directions. Cost considerations drive 
explanations toward more abstraction, but it would be miserly madness to value 
cost alone as if the ‘empty explanation’ were the most satisfying. Considerations of 
delivery, by comparison, push explanations toward the more concrete and detailed 
in a bid to increase the stability of the explanandum event. But, if price were no 
object, then we would end up with impossibly extravagant explanations that would 
invariably detail the workings of vast tracts of the universe. So, in order to account 
                                                             
14 I take this number to be finite, since there are only a finite number of ways that the 
world might be. The measure I offer, in turn, depends only on a subset of that finite 
number of possibilities. 
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for the kinds of explanations that scientists actually provide, Causal Economy plays 
cost and delivery against one another. How, then, will Causal Economy work in 
practice? That is, restricting our attention to direct event explanations, what sorts 
of causal influences will be included and excluded in explanations? 
Recall the way we defined delivery in terms of stability boost, and stability boost 
in terms of two values: baseline stability and construct stability. We determined 
baseline stability by counting the number of possible worlds in the close range in 
which the explanandum event occurs. Then, to determine construct stability, we 
introduced the causal influences cited in the explanans in every possible world in 
which they do not already occur as a matter of course, and again counted the 
number of worlds in which the explanandum event occurs. Finally, we subtracted 
the number representing baseline stability from the number representing construct 
stability. This means that the value representing stability boost will be equivalent 
to the number of worlds in which we introduced the relevant causal influences and 
the target event occurred. 
The upshot of this is that stability boost is higher for a causal influence when 
it occurs as a matter of course in fewer worlds in the close range of worlds and 
when the explanandum event occurs in many worlds in which we have introduced 
the relevant causal influences. These will, in general, be causal influences that (a) 
are themselves rather unstable (i.e., were they taken as a target event their baseline 
stability would be small), but (b) which are difference-makers for the target event. 
Why should my algorithm select these factors? Speaking to (a), only if a causal 
influence is itself unstable might it be disturbed by the perturbations that 
distinguish other worlds in the close range from our own. This is required if the 
miracle that reinstitutes that influence is have any consequence. Speaking to (b), 
only when a causal factor is necessary for the occurrence of the event will this 
reinstituting miracle even potentially eventuate in the occurrence of the 
explanandum event in worlds in the close range. 
Consider again the explanation of the retinal ganglion cell’s release of 
neurotransmitters in our example of the Hermann Grid Illusion. This event is the 
last step in an extended process of neuronal firing and has countless causal 
influences, including (to mention only those close at hand) a suitably high ATP 
concentration, the correct partition of ions across the cell membrane, and various 
properties of the embedded membrane channels. Of the myriad causal influences, 
the one that will invariably be cited in any explanation concerns whatever ‘activated’ 
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the neuron—in this case, exposure to neurotransmitters by another neuron. This 
itself is a relatively high-level or coarse-grained event and is not described in all its 
details. And although this will never be causally sufficient to bring about the target 
event, it is the one that best satisfies the above conditions (a) and (b). Exposure to 
neurotransmitters is not itself a particularly stable event, since the relevant neuron 
would not have been exposed had other neurons not fired as they did, but given 
that exposure the neuron would have fired even had many other things been 
different. 
Someone might object that this kind of account is going to cite the wrong 
causes as explanatory in certain kinds of pre-emption scenario. We can imagine 
cases in which the ‘actual cause’ would not have brought about the target event 
had conditions been even slightly different, but the target event would still have 
taken place due to ‘back-up’ factors that would be effective in a wide range of 
circumstances. Causal Economy will pick out the back-up factors as more 
explanatory than the actual cause, since they provide greater stability boost, and 
that might intuitively seem wrong. There are several things to say in response. First, 
in the most common kind of pre-emption case, one in which the back-up factors 
are similar to the actual cause, it is a virtue of the Causal Economy account that it 
includes the back-up factors in the explanation by abstracting away from particular 
causes. Thus, biologists would not explain a neuron’s release of neurotransmitters 
in terms of the very neurotransmitters it was actually exposed to, but in terms of 
the concentration of neurotransmitters released in the vicinity. In this way, the 
back-up factors and actual causes are bundled together as part of the same 
explanatory package.15 But we can cook up examples where the back-up factors are 
very different than the actual causes. One thing to say about these cases is that, 
while common in philosophical discussions of the metaphysics of causation, they 
are rather rare in actual scientific contexts. It should come as no surprise if the 
norms implicit in scientific practice are suited to routine cases, not outliers. We can 
also observe that pre-emption is a thorn in the side for many theories of causation 
and explanation (especially those employing counterfactuals). Accounts that are 
specially designed to deal with pre-emption generally pay the price of being less 
satisfactory in accounting for explanations more central to actual scientific practice. 
                                                             
15 See Nathan (this volume) for an alternative take on such back-up factors. In particular, on 
Nathan’s account, backups are packaged into the cause rather than the explanation for an 
event. 
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If Causal Economy does very well in accounting for the sorts of explanations that 
are central to scientific practice, we have reason to run with it and see how far we 
can take it. Perhaps with suitable ingenuity we could work out some conditions to 
deal with pre-emption puzzles, but this is not the place to delve into these Gettier-
like complications. 
Having said this much about which influences Causal Economy picks out as 
explanatory, what sorts of causal influences will be left aside? The answer is, 
corresponding to the two above conditions, those that are highly stable themselves, 
and those that do very little to make the explanandum event more stable, not even 
being difference-makers for it. Let us take these in reverse order. Although we 
would include every detail that had any effect on the target event if we were 
concerned with delivery alone, Causal Economy will regard causal influences 
explanatorily unimportant when they do little to make the target event more stable 
in comparison to their explanatory cost. Thus, we will entirely omit causal 
influences that make very little difference to the target event and leave out concrete 
details that add little explanatory power to a more abstract characterization. 
Causal Economy will also judge unimportant causal influences that are 
themselves highly stable. While being strictly necessary for the occurrence of the 
explanandum event, these causal influences are themselves so stable that they occur 
as a matter of course in virtually all worlds in the close range—and consequently, 
there is little or no scope for them to boost the stability of the explanandum event 
over its baseline stability. This might seem odd at first. If the relevant causal 
influences occur as a matter of course in many nearby possible worlds, then why 
shouldn’t these be considered explanatory if they occur together with the 
explanandum event? The answer is that these highly stable causal influences are 
what we usually consider background factors. It is one of the chief virtues of Causal 
Economy that it provides us with a principled reason to exclude these background 
factors from our explanations, which seems consistent with our actual explanatory 
practice—though this is often judged a shortcoming by philosophers with more a 
priori standards for what constitutes a complete explanation.16 
Saying that good explanations should maximize the ratio of delivery to cost 
assumes some way of weighing these two values against one another, since they are 
not expressed in a ‘common currency.’ What is the correct way of balancing them? 
I won’t try to offer an answer. After all, this is a hard question endemic to all 
                                                             
16 I further develop the Causal Economy treatment of background factors in my [2015]. 
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‘economic’ problems involving a trade-off of one good against another. 
Economists often assume that the weights assigned to different goods are pure 
subjective preferences. We might strive to discover a less subjective weighting 
through an examination of the actual weightings employed in scientific practice (a 
possible research program in experimental philosophy of science). Though it is 
plausible to think that there is some range of delivery-to-cost trade-offs that 
scientists do typically employ, it may well be that these weightings are not fully 
objective, and do depend on facts about our cognitive capacities and interests. This 
lack of full objectivity, however, is not as alarming as it may first appear. For even 
if it is something about us that determines the weightings, the very existence of 
‘sweet spots’ where we get more explanatory bang-for-our-buck is a feature of the 
causal architecture of the world.  
Causal Economy can, thus, account for all three categories of things that we 
have observed are usually left out of actual scientific explanations: (1) causal 
influences with very little effect on the explanandum event; (2) causal influences 
that may have a significant causal influence, but are so stable that they are usually 
regarded as background factors; and (3) insignificant concrete details of important 
causal influences.  
In describing how Causal Economy works, I have for the sake of simplicity 
been focusing on direct event explanations—explanations that cite a particular 
state of affairs and at most one causal principle linking inputs and outputs. These 
are, as I have said, essentially explanations appealing to at most one black box. 
More complex black-boxing explanations, like the full explanation of the Hermann 
Grid Illusion, describe a system of interconnected black boxes. But the way Causal 
Economy handles these is not radically different from direct event explanations. In 
particular, we simply view these complex black-boxing explanations as a collection 
of direct event explanations.17 In the simplest case, we have two black boxes, one 
                                                             
17 This requires one qualification. There are, to be more precise, two kinds of black boxes 
in actual explanatory practice. A physical black box is one in which inputs and outputs of 
each black box are described in physical terms, however abstract. A functional black box is 
one in which either the inputs or outputs are not described in physical terms, but rather 
in terms of their functional relationships with other black boxes. The example of the 
Hermann Grid Illusion featured some functional black boxes. In particular, instead of 
describing the output of photoreceptors physically (for instance, by describing this as a 
‘neurotransmitter release’), it was described in terms of its effects on retinal ganglion cells 
(they were either activated or inhibited). As I see it, functional black-boxing explanations 
leave out the physical links between boxes for expository convenience. This is indeed a 
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of whose output is the other’s input. We can think of this as two direct event 
explanations, defined by the input and outputs that were actually realized in a 
particular case. In deciding between rival explanations, we compare the causal 
economy of each set of direct event explanations. More needs to be said about 
exactly how these comparisons will be made, in particular about how we should 
compare the economy of direct event explanations of separate events. But the 
general principle of evaluation will remain the same: ask whether that additional 
detail required of one scheme of black boxes boosts the stability of the target event 
enough to justify the additional cost.  
 
7—Rationalizing the Causal Economy Standard 
I have suggested that explanatory trade-offs—in particular those between 
abstractness and stability-boosting—have the potential to account for the kinds of 
explanations that are actually offered by the high-level sciences. Alternative 
theories of explanation must instead appeal extensively to practical considerations 
to bridge the gap between real and ideal explanations. But someone might object 
that Causal Economy account avoids doing the same only by baking pragmatic 
considerations into the selection principle. After all, why should explanations—
other things equal—be more abstract if it weren’t simply because we happen to have 
limited minds unable to process in full the complex causal nexus? 
My first response is to recall the basic motivation for the Causal Economy view: 
to identify an event’s most important causal factors—those for which the event 
was, to a substantial degree, bound to happen. These factors reflect, as I’ve noted 
above, ‘sweet spots’ in the architecture of our universe. In this way, the demand 
that explanations be abstract was not an end in itself, but instead a vehicle for 
picking out what seems intuitively to be the positively explanatory features.  
One might wonder whether this reply leaves the original question unanswered, 
in a slightly different form. Why are just these factors explanatory? Why shouldn’t 
complete explanations cite more—all of an event’s difference-makers, or all its 
causal influences, or perhaps all its causal influences and metaphysical grounds 
(whatever those might be)?  
                                                             
pragmatic element of actual black-boxing explanations, albeit a limited one. If this is right, 
then functional black-boxing explanations are ultimately explanatorily parasitic on their 
physical counterparts that spell out the relevant physical properties. Therefore, to apply 
the Causal Economy account to a functional black box, one would first have to ‘translate’ 
it into a physical black box. 
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It is difficult to offer a satisfying reply to this line of questioning, but here the 
Causal Economy account is in the same situation as any other explanatory theory. 
Whatever story might be told about which factors are, or are not, explanatorily 
relevant, it is always possible to ask: why not more, less, or something different? 
The deep source of this stalemate springs from the unique nature of explanatory 
norms in the scientific project, which we can best appreciate by contrasting them 
with norms of inference.  
Though there are arguments about the proper inferential rules, the common 
ground in debates of their merits is the fact that inference aims at true belief. 
Therefore, inference principles can be evaluated based on their capacity to deliver 
this result. At what does explanation aim? Presumably, full understanding. While 
we have something like an independent grasp on truth, our only access point to 
what full understanding consists in is our notion of what constitutes a correct or 
complete explanation. Thus it is hard to stake out neutral territory from which we 
might debate the relative merits of one or another picture of explanation or 
understanding. In light of this difficulty, we can only demand of an explanatory 
account some conception of what is explanatory that ‘rings true.’ If we cannot place 
strong constraints on the explanatory principles on these a priori grounds, what 
should constrain our explanatory theorizing? As I’ve already emphasized, I take 
explanatory practice to be my guide. Best for actual scientific explanations to be 
judged correct or optimal as they stand. Given that this essay has focused on 
applying the Causal Economy account to just a particular kind of explanation—
and has dwelled on just a few examples—it remains to be seen how well its trade-
off metric captures the structure of the many kinds of explanations in scientific 
circulation. But it seems at least a promising way to begin thinking about the special 
virtues of explanation in the higher-level sciences.  
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